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Abstract
We develop the notion of perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium—perfect BNE—in general Bayesian
games. We test perfect BNE against the criteria laid out by Kohlberg and Mertens [15]. We
show that, for a focal class of Bayesian games, perfect BNE exists. Moreover, when payoffs
are continuous, perfect BNE is limit undominated for almost every type.
We illustrate the use of perfect BNE in the context of a second-price auction with interdepen-
dent values. Perfect BNE selects the unique pure strategy equilibrium in continuous strategies
that separates types. Moreover, when valuations become independent, the equilibrium con-
verges to the classical truthful dominant strategy equilibrium.
We also show that less intuitive equilibria in which types are pooled are ruled out by our
selection criterion. We further argue that standard selection criteria for second-price auctions
have no bite here. Bidders have no dominant strategies, and the separating equilibrium is not
sincere.
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1 Introduction
For normal form games with finite action spaces, Nash [24] introduced the concept of Nash equilib-
rium and proved its existence. Since Nash equilibria are not always intuitive as a solution, several
refinements of Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the literature. Among these, perfect equi-
librium (Selten [29]) is one of the most commonly used refinement concepts.
Many applications of Nash equilibrium and its refinements are in the context of incomplete infor-
mation games. Examples of games with incomplete information are signaling games (Kreps and
Wilson [16]), principal-agent models (Laffont and Martimort [17]), and models of reputation such
as the chain store paradox (Selten [30], Govindan [11]). In particular in auction design refinements
of Nash equilibrium are used to reduce the number of equilibria and rule out the less intuitive or
desirable equilibria. For example in the Vickrey auction, selection on dominant strategies singles
out the truthful equilibrium, and rules out the (many) ex post equilibria in which partial pooling
of types occurs. Also Jackson et al [13] employ perfect equilibrium in one of their examples to
eliminate equilibria in which players may bid above their maximum possible valuation.
Our aim is to develop the refinement of perfect equilibrium in the context of such applications,
in particular auction design. We focus on the game theoretic framework of Bayesian games, the
standard tool to model incomplete information. We study the class of Bayesian games in which
players, after the information phase in which they learn their type, play a one-shot game. We
develop the notion of perfect equilibrium for such games, and in effect we propose three possible
variations. We study the relations between these variations, and illustrate their use in the context
of a second price auction.
When applying refinements to auctions and incomplete information games there are typically two
problems to tackle. First, such games often feature discontinuities in the payoff functions. This
issue is addressed in for example Reny [27] and Jackson et al. [13].
Second, incomplete information games, especially auctions, often have continuum type spaces and
action spaces. Refinements for incomplete information games, such as for example sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [16]) and perfect Bayesian equilbrium (Fudenberg and Tirole [10]),
are as a rule developed for finite games, and as such not immediately applicable in the context
of auction theory and similar economic applications with incomplete information. An influential
first attempt to generalize known equilibrium refinements to more general classes of games is the
working paper by Myerson and Reny [23]. Our paper also contributes to the development of
equilibrium refinement for incomplete information games, and generalizes the notion of perfect
equilibrium to the class of Bayesian games.1
1The result in Myerson and Reny [23] covers a large class of incomplete information games. Their solution
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We take a conceptual view. A central solution concept in Bayesian games is that of Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE), a direct extension of Nash equilibrium to games with incomplete information.
A BNE is a profile of behavior strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy, given
any type for this player, is an expected value maximizer given the strategies of his opponents, where
expectations are taken over all possible types of the opponents.2 So, the best response property
that characterizes the equilibrium concept is required at the interim stage when the player already
knows his own type.3
In this paper we work with interim probabilities, unless mentioned otherwise. Our goal is to define
the notion of perfect BNE in Bayesian games, analyze its properties, and illustrate its predictive
power in an elaborate example of a second price auction with interdependent values. Our work
is motivated by the observation that, under incomplete information, standard selection criteria
in auction design, such as dominant strategy equilibrium and truthful reporting, no longer have
a bite. Also notions such as sequential equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Kreps and
Wilson [16], Fudenberg and Tirole [10], Bonanno [8]) only have selective power in the context of
extensive form games with multiple rounds. Thus in the setting of single round sealed bid auctions
these refinements do not reduce the set of equilibria. According to the theory of refinements, the
selection criterion that best suits our context is perfect equilibrium. This is the solution concept
we develop for the class of Bayesian games.
We base our approach on completely mixed behavior strategies, i.e. behavior strategies which
prescribe a completely mixed probability measure for each possible type4. We first define perfection
for general behavior strategy profiles, so not necessarily for BNEs yet. Roughly speaking, a behavior
strategy profile β is called perfect if there is a sequence (βk)∞k=1 of completely mixed behavior
strategy profiles such that, for every player i, the distance between βki and βi and the distance
between βki and player i’s best responses against β
k both converge to 0. We measure distance on
the set of actions by means of the weak metric, and we consider almost everywhere convergence
on the set of types. In general, such a profile β is not necessarily a BNE, since we did not impose
strong conditions on the type and actions spaces and on the payoff functions in the Bayesian game.
If β is also a BNE, then we call β a perfect BNE.
In the first part of the paper we define perfect BNE in Bayesian games, and test our concept against
concept assigns finitely additive probability measures, while our construction remains within the environment of
countably additive probability measures.
2Behavior strategies are much in the spirit of Bayesian games. A behavior strategy of a player prescribes
a probability measure on his set of actions, depending on the type of this player, that satisfies an additional
measurability assumption. An alternative approach based on distributional strategies is investigated in Bajoori [4].
3A similar but weaker concept arises if one calculates ex-ante probabilities, and only requires the best response
property for each player before he receives his own type. This approach is investigated for example by Reny [28]
and by Milgrom and Weber [22].
4Thus, each player takes into account mistakes by all possible types of his opponents on their action choices.
This approach is more selective than considering such mistakes for only certain types.
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the list of requirements for equilibrium refinements proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens [15]. We
prove that perfect BNE exists for Bayesian games with finite action spaces, at most countable
type spaces, and continuous payoffs. We also prove that a perfect BNE is limit undominated for
almost every type, provided that the payoff functions are continuous. We further examine the two
alternative notions of perfection, and their relations to perfect BNE, where convergence on the set
of types is required to hold either pointwisely for each type, or uniformly for all types. In addition,
we briefly discuss finite Bayesian games, i.e. when there are only finitely many types and actions.
In the second part of the paper, we illustrate the use of perfection as a tool to select the more
intuitive BNEs in Bayesian games. We do so by examining a sealed-bid second-price auction with
two bidders. In this auction, the valuation function of each bidder does not only depend on his own
type, but also on the type of his opponent. More precisely, for each i = 1, 2, bidder i’s valuation
is given by vi = 5 + ti − αtj , where α ∈ (0, 1) and j 6= i. Jackson et al. [13] and [14] considered
the first price version of this auction with α = 4 and proved that no BNE exists if each player has
a positive probability to win in case of a tie. However, they show that there exists a simple BNE
in this auction when the tie breaking rule depends on types.
This second-price auction admits multiple BNEs, but we find that perfection selects a BNE β
that is unique in a certain class of separating strategy profiles. We also show that perfection rules
out many BNEs in which pooling occurs among types. We highlight the subtleties involved in
the choice of sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1, because the most
straightforward candidate for this sequence, the uniform distribution, does not select a BNE.
We also show that standard complete information selection criteria such as dominant strategies
and truthful reporting do not apply here. Sincere reporting is not an equilibrium, the selected
BNE β is not sincere, and neither player has a dominant strategy in this auction. This emphasizes
the necessity to employ more sophisticated refinement techniques such as perfect BNE to select
among many BNEs in this auction.
As a final remark, we already observed that for example Reny [28] and Milgrom and Weber [22]
take an ex ante approach. However, both from a conceptual and a computational view, the interim
approach seems to be preferable. Conceptual, since perfect BNE is defined directly at the level of
behavior strategies. Computational, since perfect BNE is calculated at the level of the Bayesian
game itself, not in the context of the induced strategic form game. Our computations in the second
price auction emphasize these observations.
RELATED LITERATURE. Balder in [5] generalizes Milgrom and Weber’s results and proves the
existence of BNE in behavior strategies by making use of the theory of weak convergence of
transition probabilities. The same theory has been used in Balder [6] to obtain existence results
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for Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Simon and Stinchcombe [32] define perfect equilibrium for strategic form games with compact
action spaces. They discuss two essentially different approaches. The first approach is a direct
generalization of Selten’s original definition, based on the notion of completely mixed strategies.
The second approach to perfect equilibrium, by Simon and Stinchcombe referred to as the finitistic
approach, uses the notion of an ε-perfect equilibrium in finite approximations of the original game.
They show existence of these notions of perfect equilibrium, and investigate the properties of and
relations between the various resulting solution concepts.
Bajoori et al. [3] examine the two approaches proposed in Simon and Stinchcombe [32] in further
detail and provide an improved definition of the finitistic approach. Their results seem to imply a
critique on the finitistic approach.
Jackson et al. [13] study games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. In the in-
complete information setting discontinuities often arise from indifferences between players’ choices
and the particular resolution of such indifferences in the description of the game. The paper shows
in several examples that the resulting discontinuities may cause extreme behavior in equilibrium,
or even non-existence of equilibrium. They show that the introduction of a communication phase
before the start of the game may mitigate strategic effects, and restore existence of equilibrium
with truthful reporting.
Reny [28] shows, under general conditions, the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.
The main innovations in the paper are that the result is shown to hold for a wide class of partially
ordered spaces, and that best response sets only need to be join-closed (meaning that the join of
two best responses is again a best response).
Myerson and Reny [23] develop the concept of sequential equilibrium for a very general class of
multistage games with incomplete information. They prove existence of sequential equilibrium in
terms of induced finitely additive conditional probability distributions.
Fudenberg and Tirole [10] define perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for finite
Bayesian multi-period games, and show that these notions coincide when each player only has two
types.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss some preliminary notions in Section 2 and
present the model of Bayesian games in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we define the concept of
perfect BNE and analyze its properties. In Section 5, we apply our results to the above mentioned
auction. The paper ends with an extensive appendix, which contains the proofs of several technical
results that we use in earlier parts of the paper.
NOTATION. For a metric space (X, d), the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-field Σ on
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X is denoted by ∆(X). A probability measure µ ∈ ∆(X) is completely mixed if µ(U) > 0 for
every nonempty open subset U of X. The weak (Prokhorov) metric ρw on ∆(X) is defined for
every µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) by
ρw(µ, ν) = inf{ε > 0 | ∀B ∈ Σ : µ(B) ≤ ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) ≤ µ(Bε) + ε}.
Let µn ∈ ∆(X) for every n ∈ N and let µ ∈ ∆(X). It is known that if the sequence µn converges
to µ with respect to ρw, then
∫
X
f(x)µn(dx) converges to
∫
X
f(x)µ(dx) for every bounded and
continuous function f : X → R. Conversely, if X is separable and
∫
X
f(x)µn(dx) converges to∫
X
f(x)µ(dx) for every bounded and Lipschitz function f : X → R, then µn converges to µ with
respect to ρw. Further, if X is compact, then so is ∆(X) with respect to ρw (cf. Prokhorov [26]
and Parthasarathy [25]).
2 Bayesian Games
Definition 1 A Bayesian game is a tuple Γ = (N, (Ti, dTi)i∈N , (Ai, dAi)i∈N , (µi)i∈N , (Πi)i∈N )
where:
1. N = {1, 2, .., n} is the set of players.
2. Ti is a nonempty set of player i’s possible types with metric dTi . Let Ti denote the induced
Borel σ-field on Ti, T = ×
n
i=1Ti, and T = ⊗
n
i=1Ti.
3. Ai is a nonempty set of player i’s actions with metric dAi . Let Ai denote the induced Borel
σ-field on Ai, A = ×
n
i=1Ai, and A = ⊗
n
i=1Ai.
4. µi is a probability measure on (Ti, Ti) for player i. Let µ = ×
n
i=1µi be the product measure
on (T, T ).
5. Πi : T ×A→ R is player i’s payoff function, bounded and measurable with respect to T ⊗A.
Let Π = (Πi)
n
i=1.
The Bayesian game Γ is played as follows: First, nature draws a type ti ∈ Ti for each player i
according to the probability measure µi. Each player i learns his own type ti, but not the types of
the other players. Then, each player i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai, simultaneously and independently.
Finally, depending on the types t = (t1, . . . , tn) and the chosen actions a = (a1, . . . , an), each player
i receives the payoff Πi(t, a).
Now, we discuss different classes of strategies for the players. We start with the simplest ones.
Definition 2 A pure strategy for player i is a measurable function pi : Ti → Ai.
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Thus, a pure strategy prescribes one specific action depending on the player’s type. Now we move
on to the strategies which use some randomization for the choice of an action. In the finite version
of the model, i.e., when Ti and Ai are finite, a mixed strategy is a probability measure on the
set of pure strategies, whereas a behavior strategy prescribes, for each possible type, a probability
measure on the set of available actions. Aumann [2] observed however that, for our infinite model,
the above view of a mixed strategy leads to measure theoretic problems and does not provide an
acceptable definition. Instead, a mixed strategy should be modeled by a random variable with
values in the set of pure strategies, whose domain is a probability measure space that is used as
the randomization device. This is the underlying idea of the definition of a mixed strategy for
player i as a measurable function αi : Ti × [0, 1]→ Ai, where the uniform distribution is imposed
on [0, 1]. The interpretation of a mixed strategy αi is that, after observing his own type ti and
drawing a randomization-variable si from [0, 1] according to uniform distribution, player i plays
αi(ti, si). Note that, for every si ∈ [0, 1], the section function αi(·, si) : Ti → Ai is a pure strategy.
Behavior strategies are defined with similar considerations:
Definition 3 A behavior strategy for player i is a function βi : Ti ×Ai → [0, 1] such that
1. the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a probability measure for every ti ∈ Ti,
2. the section function βi(·, B) : Ti → [0, 1] is measurable for every B ∈ Ai.
5
A behavior strategy βi prescribes, depending on player i’s type ti, to choose an action accord-
ing to the probability measure βi(ti, ·). The second condition in the definition is included so
that the ex-ante probability that player i’s action falls into a set B ∈ Ai exists and is equal to∫
Ti
βi(ti, B) µi(dti). We will usually define a behavior strategy by specifying the section function
βi(ti, ·) for every type ti ∈ Ti. Behavior strategies are well suited for our purpose to define perfect
equilibrium. Indeed, the probability measures βi(ti, ·) are sufficient to describe player i’s behavior.
Moreover, as Aumann [2] showed, there is a many-to-one mapping from mixed to behavior strate-
gies that preserves the players’ expected payoffs, so mixed strategies would have no significant
added value. For these reasons, we build our definitions on behavior strategies. From now on, by
a strategy we will always mean a behavior strategy, unless mentioned otherwise.
Definition 4 A strategy βi for player i is called deterministic if, for every type ti ∈ Ti, there is an
action ai,ti ∈ Ai such that βi(ti, ·) is the Dirac measure on ai,ti . A strategy βi is called completely
mixed if the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a completely mixed probability measure for
5As the sets {ti|βi(ti, Ei) ≥ r} are measurable in the type space Ti for every measurable subset of actions
Ei ⊆ Ai, there is no difference between modeling behavior strategies as measurable functions from Ti to ∆(Ai) or
as in Definition 3 in terms of probability kernels.
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every ti ∈ Ti. The vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn), where βi is a strategy of player i, is called a strategy
profile.
Each pure strategy pi naturally induces a deterministic strategy βi, for which βi(ti, ·) is the Dirac
measure on pi(ti) for every type ti ∈ Ti.
For every strategy profile β and every player i ∈ N , we write β−i = (βj)j∈N\{i} to denote the
profile consisting of strategies of the players in N \ {i}. Further, we use Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) to denote
player i’s expected payoff, given his type ti and his strategy βi, against a strategy profile τ−i.
Thus,
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi(t, a) βi(ti, dai) τ−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
In the expected payoff above, by integrals with respect to τ−i(t−i, da−i) and µ−i(dt−i) we mean
the iterated integrals with respect to τj(tj , daj) and µj(dtj) for all j 6= i. Fubini’s Theorem and
Theorem 10.2.1 in Dudley [9] guarantee the existence of the iterated integrals in the expression
above, and also that the order of integration with respect to βi(ti, dai) and τj(tj , daj), j 6= i, is
not relevant. In the special case where player i uses a deterministic strategy with corresponding
pure strategy pi, player i’s expected payoff is denoted simply by Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi), and it is equal to
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
Πi (t, (pi(ti), a−i)) τ−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
Since, in the expected payoffs Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) and Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi), it is irrelevant how player i
chooses his actions for types other than ti, we can naturally define Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) and Eτ−i(Πi |
ti, ai) for every probability measure σi on (Ai,Ai) and respectively for every action ai ∈ Ai.
A probability measure σi on (Ai,Ai) is called a best response of player i for type ti ∈ Ti against
a strategy profile τ−i, if for every probability measure σ
′
i on (Ai,Ai) we have
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) ≥ Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σ
′
i).
The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(ti, τ−i). For a strategy profile τ , we will also use
the notation BRi(ti, τ) instead of BRi(ti, τ−i).
A strategy βi is called a best response of player i against a strategy profile τ−i, if βi(ti, ·) ∈
BRi(ti, τ−i) for every ti ∈ Ti. The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(τ−i). For a
strategy profile τ , we will also use the notation BRi(τ) instead of BRi(τ−i). Note that all these
best response sets can be empty, which is illustrated by the following simple example.
Example 5 Consider the following Bayesian game with only one player: T1 = {t1}, A1 = [0, 1],
Π1(t1, x) = x for every x ∈ [0, 1), and Π1(t1, 1) = 0. In this game, the set of the best responses
(that is, optimal strategies) of player 1 is empty. ♦
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 8
Now we define a central solution concept of Bayesian games, namely the concept of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 6 A strategy profile β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE),
if βi is a best response of player i against β, for every player i.
Remarks: There are Bayesian games which admit no BNE at all, for instance the game in Example
5. In many Bayesian games of economic interest, however, there exist multiple BNEs, and some
of them are arguably more intuitive than others. As mentioned before, our goal is to develop the
definition of perfection for BNEs, which can be a useful tool in such games to distinguish the more
intuitive BNEs.
We assumed in our model, for simplicity, that the types of the players are drawn independently,
and thus the distribution of the type-vectors is described by a product measure µ on (T, T ). Our
results can be extended to the case where the distribution of the type-vectors is described by a
probability measure ν on (T, T ) such that ν is has a density f > 0 with respect to the product
µ of the marginal probabilities. This is called diffuse information, and allows for certain kinds
of correlation between types of the players. Thus, for every type ti ∈ Ti we have a function
gi(ti) : T−i → R defined by
gi(ti)(t−i) =
f(t−i, ti)∫
T−i
f(s−i, ti)µ−i(ds−i)
.
Then for every type ti ∈ Ti and measurable set S−i ⊆ T−i,
ν(S−i|ti) =
∫
S−i
gi(ti)(t−i)µ−i(dt−i),
or in other words
ν(dt|ti) = gi(ti)(t−i)µ−i(dt−i).
Therefore, in deriving the expected payoff Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi), given probability measure ν on T , we
can write
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi(t, a) βi(ti, dai) τ−i(t−i, da−i) ν(dt|ti),
which is equivalent to
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi(t, a) βi(ti, dai) τ−i(t−i, da−i) gi(ti)(t−i)µ−i(dt−i).
Thus, the analysis for games with independent types can be equally applied to games with diffuse
information. From now on we assume that f ≡ 1, and types are not correlated.
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3 Behavioral Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this section we define perfect BNE for Bayesian games, and discuss its properties, using the list
of requirements for refinements formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens as a guide.
Definition 7 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called perfect, if for every player i there exists
a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 and a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (β
k)∞k=1 =
(βk1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following properties for every player i and every type ti ∈ Ti \ Si:
(1) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called a perfect BNE if β is both perfect and a BNE. 6
3.1 KM requirements
In their seminal paper, Kohlberg and Mertens [15] argued that any reasonable refinement of Nash
equilibrium should satisfy at least a few self-evident requirements. They proposed a list of such
requirements, and searched for a solution concept that satisfied all their requirements. Although
in their original paper they did not realize this ambition, later Mertens ([19], [20]) did exactly that.
The list of requirements proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens, with a few minor later amendments
incorporated into it, is as follows. We give a brief description of each requirement.
[1] Existence. Every game has at least one solution.
[2] Connectedness. Each solution is a connected set of strategy profiles (possibly a singleton).
[3] Admissibility. Each solution assigns exclusively admissible strategy profiles.
[4] Iterated dominance. Each solution remains to be a solution in the game that results from
deletion of a pure strategy that is not admissible.
[5] Backwards induction. Every solution contains a proper equilibrium.
[6] Forward induction. Given a solution, and a pure strategy that is not a best response against
any of the profiles assigned by the solution. Then the solution remains to be a solution when
this strategy is deleted.
[7] Ordinality. Solutions should be invariant under addition and deletion of payoff-equivalent
strategies. Solutions should only depend on the admissible best response correspondence.
6The choice for the weak metric in this definition is mainly inspired by the work of Simon and Stinchcombe’s [32].
One could also take a different metric here, but this would largely influence the results. For example, convergence
with respect to the uniform metric would be very demanding, resulting in a stronger notion of perfection.
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We want to test our notion of perfect BNE against these requirements. This agenda has two prime
components. First, the above requirements were originally phrased in the context of finite games
in strategic form. It is not always immediately clear that any given requirement makes just as
much sense outside that framework. We analyze what remains of these requirements within the
larger class of Bayesian games.
Second, for those requirements that can reasonably be generalized to the larger class of Bayesian
games, we test whether or not perfect BNE satisfies the condition at hand.
We treat each requirement in some detail. We specifically focus on Existence, Admissibility, It-
erated dominance, and Ordinality. The remaining requirements are then briefly discussed in a
separate paragraph. We conclude this section with a characterization of perfect BNE on a class of
Bayesian games defined by two fairly mild conditions.
3.2 Existence
We show that Bayesian games with at most countable type spaces, finite action spaces, and contin-
uous payoffs admit a perfect BNE. We also argue that this is more or less all we can hope for. It is
known from earlier results by, among others, Simon [31] and Hellman and Levy [12], that beyond
the restriction of countable type spaces, BNE—and hence also perfect BNE—may not exist.
EXISTENCE We consider a Bayesian game in which each player has a countable type space, a
finite action space, and a continuous payoff function. Such a Bayesian game admits a BNE, in
view of part (I) of Theorem 1 in Hellman and Levy [12]. In the next theorem we show that such
a Bayesian game even admits a perfect BNE.
Theorem 8 Let G be a Bayesian game in which every player has a type space that is at most
countable, a finite action space, and a continuous payoff function. Then, the game G admits a
perfect BNE.
Proof. The proof consists of a number of intuitive steps, and therefore we only provide a sketch.
Let G be a Bayesian game as in the theorem. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the type
space is Ti = N for every player i ∈ N .
Let ℓ ∈ N be such that ℓ ≥ maxi∈N |Ai|. For every player i ∈ N, let ∆
ℓ(Ai) denote those mixed
actions that place probability at least 1
ℓ
on each action in Ai. Choose a mixed action σ
∗
i ∈ ∆
ℓ(Ai)
for every player i ∈ N.
For every m ∈ N, let Φm,ℓi denote the set of all behavior strategies βi of player i such that
(1) β(ti, ·) ∈ ∆
ℓ(Ai) for every type ti ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and (2) βi(ti, ·) = σ
∗
i for every type ti ∈
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N \ {1, . . . ,m}. The set Φm,ℓi can be identified with ×
m
ti=1∆
ℓ(A) × ×∞ti=m+1{σ
∗
i }. Thus, the game
in which players are restricted to this space of strategy profiles can be seen as a Bayesian game
with finite type spaces and finite action spaces, where the extreme points of the restricted strategy
space function as pure actions in the new game. And since Bayesian games with finitely many
types and actions admit a BNE, it follows that there is a BNE βm,ℓ in the game in which every
player i ∈ N is restricted to the strategy set Φm,ℓi .
For every player i ∈ N , let Φℓi denote the set of all behavior strategies βi of player i such that
β(ti, ·) ∈ ∆
ℓ(Ai) for every type ti ∈ N. The set Φ
ℓ
i can be identified with ×
∞
ti=1∆
ℓ(A), which is
compact. Therefore, the sequence βm,ℓ, as m → ∞, has an accumulation point βℓ in ×i∈NΦ
ℓ
i .
By continuity of the payoff functions, βℓ is a BNE in the game in which every player i ∈ N is
restricted to the strategy set Φℓi .
The set of behavior strategies of player i can be identified with ×∞ti=1∆(A), which is also compact.
Therefore, we may assume that the sequence βℓ converges to a strategy profile β. Due to continuity,
β is a BNE in the game G. Clearly, condition (1) of Definition 7 is satisfied.
Also, given a type ti of player i, the set Ai of pure strategies at the disposal of type ti is finite.
Thus, given the type ti, we can take a subsequence so that condition (2) of Definition 7
(2) lim
ℓ→∞
ρw(βℓi (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
ℓ)) = 0
holds. So, since there are only countably many types, we can use a diagonal argument to ensure
that (2) holds for every i ∈ N and every ti ∈ Ti. Hence, the strategy profile β is perfect.
NON-EXISTENCE It is difficult to obtain existence results beyond the above conditions. This is
highlighted by part (II) of Theorem 1 in Hellman and Levy [12], who provide examples of Bayesian
games in which players have type spaces with the cardinality of the continuum without a BNE.
We also refer to Simon [31] for Bayesian games without BNE.
Perfect BNE may also fail to exist for other reasons. For instance, in Example 5 a perfect strategy
profile, and therefore a perfect BNE, does not exist, because the best response set in this game is
always empty. An example of a perfect strategy profile which is not a BNE is given in the following
example.
Example 9 Consider the following Bayesian game with only one player: T1 = {t1}, A1 = [0, 1],
Π1(t1, x) = 1 for every x ∈ [0, 1), and Π1(t1, 1) = 0. Define strategies β1 and β
k
1 , for every k ∈ N,
as follows: β1(t1, ·) = δ1(·) and β
k
1 (t1, ·) = (1 −
1
k
)δ1− 1
k
(·) + 1
k
σ(·), for every k ∈ N, where δx
is the Dirac measure on action x and σ is the uniform distribution on the Borel sets of [0, 1].
Note that the set of the pure best responses (that is, optimal strategies) of player 1 consists of
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all actions in [0, 1). So, the strategy β1 and the sequence of completely mixed strategies (β
k
1 )
∞
k=1
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 7. Therefore, β1 is a perfect strategy profile, but it is
clearly not a BNE. ♦
Remark. The above example and all further examples with a finite type space can be generalized
to a game with an infinite type space. Indeed, suppose that player i has a finite type space
Ti = {t
1
i , . . . , t
n
i }. Then, take n mutually disjoint nonempty and closed intervals Z
1, . . . , Zn, and
change the type space of player i to T˜i = Z
1∪ . . .∪Zn. The idea is that each type in the interval Zj
is a copy of type tji . Thus, define the prior probability measure µ˜i on T˜i such that µ˜i(Z
j) = µi(t
j
i )
for each j = 1, . . . , n. Finally, for each player, define a new payoff function in a natural way. In
the new game, player i has infinitely many types. This can of course be repeated for each player
who has only finitely many types.
3.3 Admissibility
In general, even in games with complete information (i.e. when the type spaces are singletons),
admissibility in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens no longer holds. This was already demon-
strated by Example 2.1 in Simon and Stinchcombe [32]. The following example again stresses this
observation.
WEAKLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES This is an example of a game with a unique Nash equilibrium,
in which both players play a weakly dominated strategy. Example 2.1 of Simon and Stinchcombe
is a similar example with interval action spaces and continuous payoffs. In our example, action
spaces are countably infinite and compact, payoffs are also continuous.
Example 10 The action spaces are A1 = A2 = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,∞}, where all natural numbers are
isolated points, and ∞ is the limit of the sequence 1, 2, . . . The topology is shown in the picture
below:
∞1 2 3 4
The payoff functions u1 and u2 are symmetric and u1 is given in the table below. Player 1 is the
row player and player 2 the column player.
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u1 1 2 3 4 . . . ∞
1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
2 1 −18 0 0 . . . 0
3 0 12
−1
16 0 . . . 0
4 0 0 14
−1
32 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
∞ 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
Notice that the pure action ∞ is weakly dominated by (0, 12 ,
1
4 ,
1
8 , . . . , 0).
Claim. The strategy pair (∞,∞) is the unique Nash equilibrium in this game.
Proof. It is obviously an equilibrium. We argue it’s the only one in this game. Let the strategy
pair (p, q) with p = (p1, p2, . . . , p∞) and q = (q1, q2, . . . , q∞) be a Nash equilibrium. We show that
p = q =∞ (so, p∞ = q∞ = 1).
Let v1 and v2 be the payoffs to player 1 and 2 resp. when the pair (p, q) is played. We consider
two cases.
Case 1. If v1 ≤ 0. Suppose that q 6= ∞. Then qk > 0 for some k = 1, 2, . . .. Since for player 1
playing strategy k + 1 should yield non-positive payoff, we get that
1
2k−1
· qk −
1
2k+2
· qk+1 ≤ 0,
which yields 8 · qk ≤ qk+1. In particular qk+1 > 0 so that the argument can be iterated: 8 · qk+1 ≤
qk+2, 8 · qk+2 ≤ qk+3, etcetera. Contradiction.
This shows that necessarily q =∞, so that v2 = 0. The symmetric argument then gives p =∞ as
well, and so that v1 = 0.
Case 2. If v1 > 0 and v2 > 0. Since v1 > 0, it follows that p1 = 0. In the same way, q1 = 0.
Then, since q1 = 0 and v1 > 0, also p2 = 0. Etcetera. We find that p = q =∞, which contradicts
v1 > 0.
All in all, the only Nash equilibrium is (∞,∞).
LIMIT UNDOMINATEDNESS Limit undominatedness is one of the few watered down interpreta-
tions of admissibility that remain valid outside the context of finite strategic form games. Since
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every limit undominated strategy profile is also limit admissible, as per definition of limit admis-
sibility in Simon and Stinchcombe [32], the theorem applies to limit admissibility too.
A probability measure σi on Ai is said to dominate a probability measure σ
′
i on Ai for a type
ti ∈ Ti, if
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) ≥ Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σ
′
i)
holds for every strategy profile τ−i and the strict inequality holds for at least one τ−i. A probability
measure σi is called undominated for a type ti if there is no probability measure on Ai that
dominates σi for ti.
A strategy βi is called limit undominated if there is a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for
every ti ∈ Ti \ Si there is a sequence of undominated probability measures (σ
k
i )
∞
k=1 on the action
space Ai for which we have ρ
w(βi(ti, ·), σ
k
i )→ 0 as k →∞. A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is
called limit undominated if βi is limit undominated for every player i.
In the following theorem we show that a perfect BNE is limit undominated, provided that the
payoff function of each player, given the types, is continuous in actions.
Theorem 11 Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a perfect BNE. If Πi(t, ·) : A → R is continuous for every
type-vector t ∈ T and every player i, then β is limit undominated.
Proof. Let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a perfect BNE. Then, according to Definition 7, for every player
i there is a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 such that for every ti ∈ Ti \ Si and a sequence of profiles of
completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 we have
(1) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) = 0.
Take an arbitrary player i, and fix a type ti ∈ Ti \Si. From condition (2), there exists a sequence of
probability measures (σki )
∞
k=1 on Ai such that σ
k
i ∈ BRi(ti, β
k), for every k, and ρw(βki (ti, ·), σ
k
i )→
0 as k →∞. By the triangle inequality, ρw(σki , βi(ti, ·))→ 0 as k →∞. Since σ
k
i is a best response
against the completely mixed profile βk, for every k, it follows from Lemma A.2 in Bajoori et al
[3] that σki is undominated, for every k.
7 Hence βi is limit undominated.
Remark. The above theorem assumes that the payoff functions, given the types, are continuous
in actions. In fact we only need the following weaker condition: for every player i and type ti,
7Lemma A.2 in Bajoori et al [3] has the following claim for a game of complete information: Provided that the
payoff function ui is continuous, if a strategy τi ∈ ∆(Ai) dominates another strategy τ
′
i
∈ ∆(Ai), then ui(τi, σ−i) >
ui(τ
′
i
, σ−i) holds for any completely mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A). Consequently, any best response to a
completely mixed strategy profile is undominated.
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if a probability measure τi ∈ ∆(Ai) dominates a probability measure τ
′
i ∈ ∆(Ai), then the set
{a−i ∈ A−i | Ea−i(Πi|ti, τi) > Ea−i(Πi|ti, τ
′
i)} has a nonempty interior.
3.4 Iterated dominance
Iterated dominance, as it was formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens, stipulates that a refinement
should be robust against (iterated) deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Example 10 shows
that, outside the context of finite strategic form games, iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies is too much to hope for. Note that, if we eliminate for example p =∞ from the game in
Example 10, the result is a game that (1) does no longer have compact action spaces, and (2) does
not have a Nash equilibrium. Insisting on robustness of a refinement to such quite drastic changes
of the game seems too much to ask of any reasonable solution concept.
ITERATED DELETION OF STRICTLY DOMINATED ACTIONS An action ai ∈ Ai is strictly dominated
when for each ti there is a strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai), such that for every strategy profile τ−i,
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) > Eτ−i(Πi | ti, ai).
The requirement that ai is strictly dominated for each type is necessary, since deletion of ai implies
that ai is no longer available for any type ti. Thus, no type should consider this to be problematic.
Hence our requirement.
It is tempting to believe that a perfect BNE will remain a perfect BNE after deletion of a strictly
dominated pure action. At least, a BNE will certainly remain a BNE under this operation. And
although the claim for perfect BNE sounds plausible, it’s not true, not even for perfect Nash
equilibrium in finite strategic form games, as the following example shows.
Example 12 Consider the bimatrix game with payoff matrices
A =
 0 00 0
−1 −1
 and B =
1 11 0
0 1

In this game the Nash equilibrium ((1, 0, 0)(0, 1)) is perfect. It is the limit of the ε-perfect strategy
pairs ((1− 2ε, ε, ε)(ε, 1− ε)). However, when we delete the third row, which is strictly dominated
for player 1, the resulting game is
C =
[
0 0
0 0
]
and D =
[
1 1
1 0
]
in which game player 2 plays (1, 0) in any perfect Nash equilibrium. ♦
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Thus, even for finite strategic form games, iterated dominance typically agrees with stronger notions
of stability, but not with perfect equilibrium. 8
We can prove that any BNE puts zero weight on a strictly dominated pure action.
Lemma 13 Let β be a BNE. Suppose that ai ∈ Ai is strictly dominated. Then for every type
ti ∈ Ti, βi(ti, {ai}) = 0.
Proof. Fix type ti. Suppose that βi(ti, {ai}) > 0. We derive a contradiction. Since ai is strictly
dominated, there is a strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai) such that
Eβ−i(Πi | ti, σi) > Eβ−i(Πi | ti, ai).
Define Bi = Ai\{ai}, ηi = βi(ti, {ai}), and τi = IBi ·βi+ηi ·σi where IBi denotes the characteristic
function on Bi. Then
Eβ−i(Πi | ti, τi) > Eβ−i(Πi | ti, βi),
and β is not a BNE. Contradiction.
With a bit more work, one can also show that the restriction of a BNE to the game where the
strictly dominated strategy is deleted remains a BNE. This is fairly straightforward though, and
somewhat outside the scope of the current paper, so we will not go into details.
3.5 Ordinality
While perfect equilibrium satisfies invariance in the setting of finite strategic form games—see for
example Mertens [21] and Vermeulen and Jansen [33]—perfection violates invariance even in games
with complete information if the action spaces are infinite, as is pointed out in Bajoori et al. [3].
3.6 Remaining requirements
CONNECTEDNESS It is well-known, even in the classical setting of finite strategic form games,
that the set of perfect equilibria need not be connected. Thus, also in our context, this requirement
is not valid for perfect BNE.
BACKWARDS INDUCTION The intuition for forward and backwards induction originate from
extensive form games. In that sense these notions do not directly apply to our setting. One more
demanding interpretation of Kohlberg and Mertens of backwards induction is that each solution
8In fact this observation was one of the key arguments in the motivation of Kohlberg and Mertens to search
for set-valued solution concepts. Still, BNE satisfies iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, even when
interpreted as a singleton-valued solution concept. This particular research topic is outside the scope of the current
paper though, and we will not venture into details.
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set should contain a proper equilibrium. As it is, proper BNE has not (yet) been defined for
Bayesian games. Of course, any possible definition in the spirit of perfect BNE would result in the
observation the set of perfect BNE’s will contain a proper BNE, as soon as a proper BNE exists.
FORWARD INDUCTION The interpretation of Kohlberg and Mertens of forward induction in the
context of finite strategic form games is already violated by perfect Nash equilibrium. This can
be seen in Example 12, which features a special case of this requirement. Hence, also perfect BNE
fails on this criterion.
3.7 A characterization
In this paragraph we provide an alternative definition for perfect BNE on a class of Bayesian games
that is specified by the following two measurability conditions:
• Condition M1: For any player i and any strategies β1i , β
2
i of player i, the map
ti 7→ ρ
w(β1i (ti, ·), β
2
i (ti, ·))
is measurable.
• Condition M2: For any player i, any strategy βi of player i, and any strategy profile τ , the
map
ti 7→ ρ
w(βi(ti, ·), BRi(ti, τ))
is measurable.
Condition M1 is mild, and M1 is always satisfied if the action spaces are separable (cf. Lemma
32). It seems likely that M2 holds under the assumption that the action spaces are measurable
subsets of a Polish (complete and separable metric) space.9
Now, we present a number of conditions that are all equivalent to perfection of strategy profiles,
given assumptions of M1 and M2. All implications are straightforward, so the formal proof is
omitted.
Claim 14 Consider a Bayesian game which satisfies conditions M1 and M2. Then, for every
strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn), equivalent are:
i. The strategy profile β is perfect.
ii. There exists a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1
such that for every player i and every ε > 0:
(ii.1) lim
k→∞
µi
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρ
w(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) ≥ ε
}
= 0,
9This condition for M2 is suggested by one of the referees.
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(ii.2) lim
k→∞
µi
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρ
w(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) ≥ ε
}
= 0.
iii. There exists a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1
such that for every player i:
(iii.1) lim
k→∞
∫
Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) µi(dti) = 0,
(iii.2) lim
k→∞
∫
Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) µi(dti) = 0.
The intuition behind conditions (ii) and (iii) is the following. For every player i and every k ∈ N,
define a function Xki : Ti → R by X
k
i (ti) = ρ
w
(
βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)
)
, and a function Y ki : Ti → R
by Y ki (ti) = ρ
w
(
βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)
)
. Due to the assumptions M1 and M2, these functions are
measurable, and therefore they are random variables on the measurable space (Ti, Ti). Conditions
(ii.1) and (ii.2) respectively require that both sequences Xki and Y
k
i converge in probability to zero
(i.e. to the random variable that is zero everywhere). So, the probability that Xki and Y
k
i are far
from zero becomes negligible for large k. Conditions (iii.1) and (iii.2) mean that both sequences Xki
and Y ki converge in expectation to zero, with respect to the distribution µi. This makes intuitive
sense because the type of player i is drawn from Ti according to µi.
4 Alternative notions of perfection
In this section, we examine two alternative notions of perfection, where convergence on the set of
types is required to hold pointwise for each type or, respectively, uniformly for all types.10
4.1 Pointwise perfection
Definition 15 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called pointwise-perfect, if there exists a
sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following
properties for every player i and each type ti ∈ Ti:
(1) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called a pointwise-perfect BNE if β is a BNE and pointwise-perfect.
Note that conditions (1) and (2) in the above definition require pointwise convergence of the
corresponding distances over the set of possible types. Hence, every pointwise-perfect strategy
profile is perfect, and every pointwise-perfect BNE is a perfect BNE.
10In game theory, sets of measure 0 often play an unimportant role. In extensive form games, however, various
solution concepts take information sets into account that are reached with probability 0. In the definitions of this
section, we take information sets into account that are only reached with probability 0 with respect to the prior
probability distribution on the type spaces of the players.
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The following theorem provides sufficient conditions under which a pointwise-perfect strategy pro-
file is a BNE. The proof can be found in the Appendix I.
Theorem 16 In a Bayesian game where the action spaces are separable and Πi(t, ·) is continuous
on A for every player i and every t ∈ T , every pointwise-perfect strategy profile is a BNE.
It is clear that every pointwise-perfect BNE is perfect. The following example proves that the
converse is not always true.
Example 17 Consider the following Bayesian game with two players: The type spaces are T1 =
{t1} and T2 = {t
1
2, t
2
2}, and µ2 is given by µ2(t
1
2) = 1 and µ2(t
2
2) = 0. The action spaces are
A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,R}. The payoff matrix is the following if player 1 is given type t1
whereas player 2 is given type tm2 for m = 1, 2:
(t1, t
m
2 ) L R
U 0, 1 0, 0
D 1, 0 1, 0
Define p1(t1) = D, p2(t
1
2) = L and p2(t
2
2) = R. Let β1 and β2 be the deterministic strategies
corresponding to p1 and p2 respectively. It is clear that (β1, β2) is a perfect BNE, by choosing
S1 = ∅ and S2 = {t
2
2} in Definition 7. Yet, (β1, β2)is not pointwise-perfect, because player 2
chooses R with probability 1 if he receives type t22.
We remark that a similar example can be made where T2 = [0, 1], µ2 is the uniform distribution
on T2, and where the strategy profile is not pointwise-perfect only due to a single type, say type
t2 = 1. ♦
The following theorem presents conditions under which there is a strong connection between per-
fection and pointwise-perfection. The proof can be found in the Appendix I.
Proposition 18 Let β be a perfect BNE in a Bayesian game with compact action spaces. Let Si,
for every player i, and (βk)∞k=1 be as in Definition 7 for β. Suppose that Si is countable for every
player i and BRi(ti, β
k) is nonempty for every player i, every type ti ∈ Si and every k ∈ N. Then,
there is a pointwise-perfect BNE βˆ such that βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·) holds for every player i and every
type ti ∈ Ti \ Si.
The following corollary follows easily from Proposition 18.
Corollary 19 Consider a Bayesian game in which the type spaces are countable, the action spaces
are compact, and the payoff functions are continuous. Then, for every perfect BNE β, there exists
a pointwise-perfect BNE βˆ such that, for every player i, we have βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·) for µi-a.e. type
ti ∈ Ti.
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The next example shows that the condition that Si is countable is crucial in Proposition 18 if there
are at least three players. In this game, the type and action spaces are compact and the payoff
functions are continuous. We do not know if this condition is also crucial for games with only two
players.
Example 20 Consider the following Bayesian game with three players. The type spaces11 are
T1 = {0, 1}
N, T2 = {t2} and T3 = {t3}. The metric dT1 on T1 is defined as follows: for t1, t
′
1 ∈ T1,
if t1 = t
′
1 then let dT1(t1, t
′
1) = 0, otherwise if m is the first coordinate in which t1 and t
′
1 differ,
then let dT1(t1, t
′
1) = 2
−m. Notice that dT1 induces the product topology on T1. Further, let
µ1 = δ(1,1,...), i.e. the Dirac measure on the type (1, 1, . . .). The action spaces are A1 = {U,D},
A2 = {a1, a2, . . . , a∞}, and A3 = {b1, b2, . . . , b∞}, in which am = bm = 1−
1
m
for every m ∈ N and
a∞ = b∞ = 1. For every type t1 ∈ {0, 1}
N, let fm(t1) be the m-th coordinate of the sequence t1.
When player 1 is given type t1 ∈ {0, 1}
N \ {1, 1, . . .}, the payoff of player 1 is independent of the
action chosen by player 3, and it is given by
t1 ∈ {0, 1}
N \ {(1, 1, . . .)} am a∞
U fm(t1) 0
D 1−fm(t1) 0
whereas if player 1 is given type t1 = (1, 1, . . .):
t1 = (1, 1, . . .) am a∞
U 0 0
D 0 0
The payoffs of players 2 and 3 are independent of the action chosen by player 1, and are given by:
b1 b2 b3 b4 . . . b∞
a1 0,0 0,
1
2 0,
1
3 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a2
1
2 ,0 0,0 0,
1
3 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a3
1
3 ,0
1
3 ,0 0,0 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a4
1
4 ,0
1
4 ,0
1
4 ,0 0,0 . . . 0,0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
a∞ 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 . . . 0,0
11Such rather abstract type spaces are not unusual, see for instance Simon [31] or Hellman and Levy [12], and
the references therein.
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In general, if player 2 chooses action am and player 3 chooses action bℓ, with m, ℓ ∈ N, then player
2’s payoff is 1
m
if m > ℓ, and 0 otherwise, and player 3’s payoff is 1
ℓ
if ℓ > m, and 0 otherwise.
Note that the type and action spaces in this game are all compact. Since the payoff functions
of players 2 and 3 are continuous, and player 1 has only finitely many actions, the best reply set
BRi(ti, β) is nonempty for every player i, every ti ∈ Ti and every strategy profile β. This game
has the following properties: (1) there exists a perfect equilibrium in this game, but (2) this game
admits no pointwise-perfect strategy profile. The proof of both properties can be found in the
Appendix I. ♦
4.2 Uniform perfection
Definition 21 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called uniform-perfect, if there exists a se-
quence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following
properties for every player i:
(1) lim
k→∞
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, β
k)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called a uniform-perfect BNE if β is a BNE and uniform-perfect.
Note that conditions (1) and (2) in the above definition require a uniform convergence of the corre-
sponding distances over the set of possible types. In the special case when the game has complete
information, i.e. each Ti is a singleton, our definition coincides with Simon and Stinchcombe’s
weak perfect equilibrium in [32].
It is clear that every uniform-perfect BNE is also pointwise-perfect. Now, we provide a game which
demonstrates that the converse is not always true. This game has a pointwise-perfect BNE, but it
has no uniform-perfect BNE, in fact not even a uniform-perfect strategy profile, although the type
and action spaces are compact and the payoff functions are continuous.
Example 22 Consider the following Bayesian game with two players: Player 1 has only one
possible type, T1 = {t1}, whereas player 2’s type space is T2 = {t
1
2, t
2
2, . . . , t
∞
2 } in which t
∞
2 is the
limit point of the sequence (tm2 )
∞
m=1. The probability measure µ2 on (T2, T2) is arbitrary.
12 The
action spaces are A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,R}. The payoff matrix when player 1 is the row-player
and is given type t1, and player 2 is the column-player and is given type t
m
2 , for every m ∈ N, is
12The more interesting case is when µ2 assigns a positive mass to every point in T2; otherwise one would have
almost everywhere uniform convergence.
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the following:
(t1, t
m
2 ) L R
U 0,− 1
m
0, 0
D 1, 1
m2
1, 0
and the payoff matrix when player 1 is given type t1 and player 2 is given type t
∞
2 is:
(t1, t
∞
2 ) L R
U 0, 0 0, 0
D 1, 0 1, 0
Observe that the type and action spaces in this game are compact, and the payoff functions are
continuous.
Define p1(t1) = D and p2(t
m
2 ) = L, for every m ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Let β1 and β2 be the deterministic
strategies corresponding to p1 and p2 respectively. We claim that (β1, β2) is a pointwise-perfect
BNE, but the game has no uniform-perfect strategy profile, so no uniform-perfect BNE either.
The proof that (β1, β2) is a pointwise-perfect BNE: Clearly, (β1, β2) is a BNE, so it remains
to prove that (β1, β2) is pointwise-perfect. For every k ∈ N, define two completely mixed strategies
βk1 and β
k
2 by letting β
k
1 (t1, ·) = (1−
1
k
)δD(·)+
1
k
δU (·) and β
k
2 (t
m
2 , ·) = (1−
1
k
)δL(·)+
1
k
δR(·) for every
m ∈ N ∪ {∞}, where δx denotes the Dirac measure on x. The sequence (β
k)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , β
k
2 )
∞
k=1
clearly satisfies condition (1) of Definition 15, and it also satisfies condition (2) for player 1 and
condition (2) for type t∞2 of player 2. It remains to verify condition (2) for an arbitrary type t
m
2
for player 2 where m ∈ N. Take such a type tm2 . We have
Eβk1
(Π2 | t
m
2 , L) = (1−
1
k
) · 1
m2
+ 1
k
· (− 1
m
),
which is strictly positive for large k. Hence, BR2(t
m
2 , β
k) = {δL} for large k, which implies that
condition (2) of Definition 15 holds for type tm2 . Thus, (β1, β2) is pointwise-perfect indeed.
The proof that this game has no uniform-perfect strategy profile: Suppose by way of
contradiction that τ = (τ1, τ2) is a uniform-perfect strategy profile. Then, there is a sequence of
completely mixed strategy profiles (τk)∞k=1 = (τ
k
1 , τ
k
2 )
∞
k=1 that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of
Definition 21 for τ . First notice that, by the triangle inequality for ρw, we have
sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τ2(t2, ·), BR2(t2, τ
k)) ≤ sup
t2∈T2
[
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), τ2(t2, ·)) + ρ
w(τk2 (t2, ·), BR2(t2, τ
k))
]
≤ sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), τ2(t2, ·)) + sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), BR2(t2, τ
k)),
and therefore conditions (1) and (2) imply
lim
k→∞
sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τ2(t2, ·), BR2(t2, τ
k)) = 0. (1)
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For every k ∈ N, the probability measure τk1 (t1, ·) can be written in the form τ
k
1 (t1, ·) = (1 −
εk)δU (·) + εkδD(·) with some εk ∈ (0, 1). Due to condition (2) for player 1, we must have that
εk → 1 as k →∞.
For every k ∈ N and every type tm2 for player 2, where m ∈ N, we have
Eτk1
(Π2 | t
m
2 , L) = εk ·
1
m2
+ (1− εk) · (−
1
m
),
whereas Eτk1 (Π2 | t
m
2 , R) = 0. It has two consequences. First, for every t
m
2 , where m ∈ N, we have
BR2(t
m
2 , τ
k) = {δL} for large k, which in view of (1) yields τ2(t
m
2 , ·) = δL(·) for every t
m
2 , where
m ∈ N. Second, for every k ∈ N, we have BR2(t
m
2 , τ
k) = {δR} for large m. In conclusion, for every
k ∈ N, if m is large, then τ2(t
m
2 , ·) = δL(·) and BR2(t
m
2 , τ
k) = {δR}. This is in contradiction with
(1), so τ is not a uniform-perfect strategy profile. ♦
4.3 Perfection in Finite Bayesian Games
In games with finitely many types and actions
[1] it is clear that the uniform and the pointwise approaches coincide, and
[2] by Proposition 18, a perfect BNE is also pointwise-perfect or uniform-perfect, unless certain
types occur with probability 0.
Thus, Theorem 8 together with Proposition 18 imply the following result.
Corollary 23 Every Bayesian game with finitely many actions and finitely many types admits a
pointwise-perfect (or equivalently, uniform-perfect) BNE.
5 A second-price auction with interdependent values
We examine perfect equilibrium in a second price auction with interdependent values, in which
bidders have no dominant strategies. In this auction we identify a symmetric BNE β, and argue
that β is a natural candidate solution for the auction from a conceptual and normative perspective.
The BNE β separates the types, and it is continuous—even differentiable, so that bids increase
smoothly with type. We show that β is unique in this respect, there is no other BNE that features
these properties. Moreover, as valuations become independent (α converges to zero), the BNE β
converges to the classical truthful dominant strategy equilibrium in the Vickrey auction.
We show that perfect equilibrium is a useful tool to select the BNE β in this auction. In particular,
we show that β is uniform-perfect. Next, we present a few classes of other BNEs for the auction.
These BNEs are arguably less intuitive in the sense that types (at least partially) pool their bids.
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We show that perfection eliminates these equilibria, so that the BNE β is uniquely selected by
perfection from a large class of BNEs. Finally we argue that the usual standard selection criteria
sincere bidding and dominant strategy equilibrium, have no bite in this context, and do not single
out the BNE β. As the proofs in this section are technical in nature, we only discuss the main
results, and defer the formal proofs to the appendix.
Consider the following sealed-bid second price auction Γα for a single indivisible object, where
α is a parameter in (0, 1). There are two bidders, whose respective types t1 and t2 are drawn
independently from T1 = T2 = [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution. The valuations of the
bidders are symmetric and are given by v1(t1, t2) = 5+ t1 − αt2 and v2(t1, t2) = 5+ t2 − αt1. The
set of available bids is A1 = A2 = [5− α, 6]. The tie-breaking rule can be arbitrary, and plays no
role in our analysis. 13
5.1 A symmetric BNE
For each bidder i, define the pure strategy Bi(ti) = 5+(1−α)ti, and denote by βi the corresponding
deterministic strategy. In this subsection we argue that, from a conceptual and normative point
of view, the strategy pair β = (β1, β2) is a natural candidate solution for the auction.
Concretely, we have the following claims. The strategy pair β is a symmetric BNE, it separates
the types, and it is continuous—even differentiable, so that bids increase smoothly with type. It is
also unique in this, there is no other strategy pair that features all these properties. Moreover, as
valuations become independent, so α→ 0, the BNE β converges to the classical truthful dominant
strategy equilibrium in the Vickrey auction.
We first observe that β is a BNE. The proof of this observation is deferred to Appendix II.
Proposition 24 The symmetric deterministic strategy profile β = (β1, β2) is a BNE.
Next, we show that β is the unique BNE within the class of differentiable separating pure strategy
pairs. Let F be the class of deterministic strategies in which the corresponding pure strategies
pi : Ti → Ai for bidders i = 1, 2 satisfy the following conditions:
(i) p1(0) = p2(0) and p1(1) = p2(1),
(ii) pi is continuous and strictly increasing in ti.
Note that elements of F separate the types of a player in the sense that the type can be inferred
from the bid since no two types make the same bid. 14 We have the following proposition.
13Bajoori [4] and Liu [18] study a similar class of auctions. In both papers valuations are increasing in both types,
Liu [18] studies common value auctions. Comparable to our results, they find that continuous BNEs are robust
against perturbations, while discontinuous BNEs are not.
14The first condition is mainly a normalization.
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Proposition 25 The BNE β is the only pure BNE in class F.
Thus, the BNE β is the unique continuous separating BNE. Moreover, as we already noted, when
valuations become independent (so, when α → 0) β converges to the truthful dominant strategy
equilibrium in the Vickrey auction.
5.2 The selective power of perfect BNE
Thus, β is a natural candidate as a solution for the auction we study. We show that perfect BNE
does select the differentiable separating BNE β, from among many equilibria in the auction. We
first show that β is a perfect BNE.
Proposition 26 The BNE β is uniform-perfect.
We describe the idea of the proof. Let CM : [0, 1]→ [5− α, 6] be defined by CM (r) = 5+ (1− α)r
for all r ∈ [0, 1] and µ be the uniform distribution on [5− α, 6]. The first idea would be to look at
the sequences of completely mixed strategies βˆki given by βˆ
k
i (ti, ·) = (1− εk)δCM (ti)(·) + εkµ(·) for
both players i = 1, 2 and for every ti, where δ is the Dirac measure and εk is a sequence in (0, 1)
converging to zero. One can verify that the sequence βˆki satisfies condition (1) of Definition 21, and
limk→∞ ρ
w(βˆki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βˆ
k)) = 0 for every ti ∈ (0, 1). However, the latter does not hold for ti =
0, 1. More precisely, one can easily check that BRi(0, βˆ
k) = {5− 12α} and BRi(1, βˆ
k) = {6− 12α},
for every k. However, by defining the completely mixed strategies in a more delicate way, we can
prove that (β1, β2) is uniform-perfect. We introduce two more curves CT , CL : [0, 1]→ [5−α, 6] by
CT (r) = 6− αr
2, and CL(r) = 5− α+ α(1− r)
2. These curves are depicted in the picture below.
r
CL
CT
CM
5
5 − α
6 − α
6
0 1
The curves CT and CL will be used to repair the above mentioned problem for types 0 and 1. For
every k ∈ N, let εk =
1
k+3 and β
k
1 : T1 ×A1 → [0, 1] be the completely mixed strategy for bidder 1
which is given for every t1 ∈ T1 = [0, 1] by
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k) δCM (t1)(·) + εk δCT (t1)(·) + εk δCL(t1)(·) + ε
2
k µ(·).
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The cumulative probability distribution with respect to βk1 (t1, ·) is shown on A1 = [5−α, 6] in the
picture below.
b1
1
5 − α CL(t1) CM (t1) CT (t1) 6
Similarly, define a completely mixed strategy βk2 for bidder 2. In Appendix II we will show that
the sequence of strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , β
k
2 )
∞
k=1 satisfies conditions 1 and 2 of Definition
21. Hence, the BNE β is uniform-perfect.
Next, we present a few classes of other BNEs for the auction. They are arguably less intuitive in
the sense that types (at least partially) pool their bids. We show that perfection eliminates these
equilibria. We start with Wolf and Sheep BNEs.
Proposition 27 The deterministic strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2), given by σ1(t1, ·) = δ6(·) for every
t1 ∈ T1 and σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·) for every t2 ∈ T2, is a BNE. However, σ is not pointwise-perfect,
and hence not uniform-perfect either.
It is worthwhile to note that the BNE introduced in Proposition 27 is just one of the many other
BNEs of the same type. In all of this type of BNEs, the lowest bid of Wolf player is strictly larger
than the highest bid of Sheep player.
The following proposition considers a deterministic BNE in which the corresponding pure strategies,
as functions of the types, are not continuous. Also on this type of BNE we could construct many
variations.
Proposition 28 The deterministic strategy profile η = (η1, η2) is a BNE, where η1 and η2 corre-
spond to the pure strategies b1 and b2 given by
b1(t1) =
{
5 if t1 ∈ [0, x(α)]
6 if t1 ∈ (x(α), 1]
and b2(t2) =
{
5− α if t2 ∈ [0, y(α)]
5.1 if t2 ∈ (y(α), 1]
,
with x(α) = 0.4+2α4−α2 and y(α) =
α(0.2+α)
4−α2 .
However, η is not pointwise-perfect, and hence not uniform-perfect either.
Thus, perfection selects the equilibrium β from among a large class of equilibria. Finally we argue
that other standard selection criteria such as sincere bidding and dominance do not have a bite
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 27
when types are interdependent. (that is, when α > 0). 15 In particular, these selection criteria do
not single out the separating BNE β in this example.
Proposition 29 There does not exist a symmetric, deterministic, and strictly increasing BNE in
which bidders bid sincerely given the opponent’s bid function. In particular, the BNE β is not
sincere, in the sense that for each bidder i, there are types ti for which Bi(ti) does not equal his
expected evaluation of the object given ti.
Proposition 30 Neither bidder has a dominant strategy in the auction Γα in the following sense:
neither bidder i has a strategy βi such that for every type ti, every strategy σi of bidder i and every
strategy β−i of bidder i’s opponents we have
Eβ−i(Πi | ti, βi) ≥ Eβ−i(Πi | ti, σi).
In fact, in Appendix II we prove a somewhat stronger statement, namely that in the above state-
ment we could replace “every type ti” by “every type ti in a subset of types with a strictly positive
measure”.
Hence, the usual standard selection criteria sincere bidding and dominant strategy equilibrium,
have no bite in the context of Bayesian games, and do not single out the BNE β.
6 Appendix I: Proofs for the alternative notions of perfec-
tion in Section 4
6.1 Proof of Theorem 16
Suppose that β = (β1, . . . , βn) is a pointwise-perfect strategy profile in such a Bayesian game.
For β, take a sequence of strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 as in Definition 15. Fix a player i and a type
ti ∈ Ti. Due to condition (2) in Definition 15, there exists a Ki(ti) ∈ N such that BRi(ti, β
k) is
nonempty for every k ≥ Ki(ti). Therefore, by condition (2) once more, there exists a sequence
(σki,ti)
∞
k=1 of probability measures on (Ai,Ai) such that σ
k
i,ti
∈ BRi(ti, β
k) for every k ≥ Ki(ti)
and ρw(βki (ti, ·), σ
k
i,ti
)→ 0 as k →∞. By condition (1) and by the triangle inequality for ρw, this
implies that ρw(βi(ti, ·), σ
k
i,ti
)→ 0 as k →∞.
For every k ≥ Ki(ti) and every probability measure σ
′ on (Ai,Ai), we have due to σ
k
i,ti
∈
BRi(ti, β
k) that Eβk
−i
(Πi | ti, σ
k
i ) ≥ Eβk
−i
(Πi | ti, σ
′), which means that∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ
k
i,ti
(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i) (2)
15Given type ti, bidder i’s bid is sincere when he reports the expected value of the item, given the bid functions
of the other bidders.
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≥
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ
′(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
According to Theorem 3.2 in [7], in a separable product space the weak convergence of the product
measure is equivalent to the weak convergence of the marginal measures. Hence, because A is
separable, the weak convergence of σki,ti to βi(ti, ·) and of β
k
j (tj , ·) to βj(tj , ·) for every player j 6= i
and every type tj ∈ Tj implies that, for any t−i ∈ T−i, the product measure σ
k
i,ti
×
(
×j 6=iβ
k
j (tj , ·)
)
on (A,A) weakly converges to the product measure βi(ti, ·) × (×j 6=iβj(tj , ·)). Since the payoff
function Πi((ti, t−i), ·) is continuous on A for every t−i ∈ T−i, by Fubini’s theorem we have for
every t−i ∈ T−i
lim
k→∞
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ
k
i,ti
(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i)
=
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i),
and similarly
lim
k→∞
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ
′(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i)
=
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ
′(dai) β−i(t−i, da−i).
Thus, if we take the limit in inequality (2) when k → ∞, by the dominated convergence theorem
we obtain∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi (t, a) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i)
≥
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi (t, a) σ
′(dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i),
which means Eβ−i(Πi | ti, βi(ti, ·)) ≥ Eβ−i(Πi | ti, σ
′). Hence, βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). Since player i
and type ti were chosen arbitrary, the strategy profile β is a BNE as claimed.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 18
For a perfect BNE β as in Theorem 18, we can construct a desired pointwise-perfect BNE βˆ as
follows. For every player i ∈ N , every type ti ∈ Si, and every k ∈ N, by assumption of the
proposition, we can choose a probability measure σki,ti ∈ BRi(ti, β
k). Now, define a profile of
completely mixed strategies βˆk, for every k ∈ N, by letting
βˆki (ti, ·) =
{
βki (ti, ·) if ti ∈ Ti \ Si
(1− 1
k
)σki,ti(·) +
1
k
βki (ti, ·) if ti ∈ Si
for every player i ∈ N and type ti ∈ Ti.
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In the remaining part of the proof, we use several fairly known results from analysis, which can
all be found in [1]. By assumption, Ai is compact in the topology induced by the metric dAi , so
the set ∆(Ai) of probability measures on (Ai,Ai) is also compact with respect to the topology
induced by the weak metric. Consequently, the product space ×i∈N ×ti∈Si ∆(Ai) is compact in
the product topology by Tychonoff’s theorem, and because Si is countable, this topology is even
metrizable. Therefore, this topological space is sequentially compact, which assures the existence
of a subsequence (kr)
∞
r=1 so that σ
kr
i,ti
converges to some σi,ti ∈ ∆(Ai), for every player i ∈ N and
every ti ∈ Ti, with respect to the weak metric. So, define a strategy for every player i ∈ N by
βˆi(ti, ·) =
{
βi(ti, ·) if ti ∈ Ti \ Si
σi,ti(·) if ti ∈ Si
for every type ti ∈ Ti. Notice that the profile βˆ = (βˆi)i∈N is a pointwise-perfect equilibrium.
Indeed, for the sequence βˆkr , condition (1) of Definition 15 is obviously satisfied, and so is condition
(2) because BRi(ti, βˆ
kr ) = BRi(ti, β
kr ) holds due to µj(Sj) = 0 for all players j.
6.3 Proofs for Example 20
A perfect BNE: First we construct a perfect BNE. Define p1(t1) = U for every t1 ∈ T1, p2(t2) =
a∞ and p3(t3) = b∞. Let β˜i be the deterministic strategy for each player i corresponding to pi.
Now we prove that β˜ = (β˜1, β˜2, β˜3) is a perfect BNE. Let S1 = T1 \ {(1, 1, . . .)} and S2 = S3 = ∅.
Further, take arbitrary completely mixed probability measures σ2 and σ3 on (A2,A2) and (A3,A3),
respectively. For every k ∈ N, define the completely mixed strategies
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1−
1
k
) · δU (·) +
1
k
· δD(·) for every t1 ∈ T1
βk2 (t2, ·) = (1−
1
k2
) · δak(·) +
1
k2
· σ2(·)
βk3 (t3, ·) = (1−
1
k2
) · δbk(·) +
1
k2
· σ3(·).
If player 2 plays actions ak+1 against β
k
3 (t3, ·), then he receives at least (1 −
1
k2
) 1
k+1 , whereas he
receives at most 1
k+2 by playing an action aℓ with ℓ > k + 1 and receives at most
1
2k2 by playing
an action aℓ with ℓ < k+1. Thus, for every k ≥ 3, action ak+1 is player 2’s (unique) best response
to βk3 (t3, ·), and for similar reasons, action bk+1 is player 3’s (unique) best response to β
k
2 (t2, ·).
Based on this observation, one can check easily that S1, S2, S3 and the sequence β
k = (βk1 , β
k
2 , β
k
3 )
satisfy the conditions of Definition 7 for β˜. Thus, β˜ is a perfect BNE indeed.
No pointwise-perfect strategy profile: Now we claim that there is no pointwise-perfect strat-
egy profile in this game. (Note that S1 above is uncountable, so Proposition 18 does not apply.)
Suppose by way of contradiction that β = (β1, β2, β3) is a pointwise-perfect strategy profile, with
some sequence (βk)∞k=1 as required in Definition 15.
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First we prove that β2(t2, ·) and β3(t3, ·) put probability 1 on action a∞ and b∞, respectively,
i.e. β2(t2, {a∞}) = β3(t3, {b∞}) = 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that β2(t2, {a∞}) < 1;
the proof is similar if β3(t3, {b∞}) < 1. Let m
∗ = min{m ∈ N | β2(t2, {am}) > 0}. Since
player 3 can get a positive payoff against β2(t2, ·), and β3(t3, ·) is a best response to β2(t2, ·), we
must have β3(t3, {b∞}) = 0. So, also player 2 can get a positive payoff against β3(t3, ·). Let
ℓ∗ = min{ℓ ∈ N|β3(t3, {bℓ}) > 0}. Now, if m
∗ ≤ ℓ∗, then action am∗ gives payoff zero to player 2,
which is a contradiction as β2(t2, {am∗}) > 0. Similarly, if ℓ
∗ ≤ m∗, then action bℓ∗ gives payoff
zero to player 3, which is a contradiction as β3(t3, {bℓ∗}) > 0. So, β2(t2, {a∞}) = β3(t3, {b∞}) = 1
must hold indeed.
For every k ∈ N, let σk be the probability measure on (A2,A2) defined by σ
k(a∞) = 0 and
σk(am) =
βk2 (t2, {am})
1− βk2 (t2, {a∞})
for every m ∈ N. So, σk(am) equals the probability that action am is chosen with respect to
βk2 (t2, ·) conditioned on the event that a∞ is not chosen. We now claim that for every m ∈ N
lim
k→∞
σk({a1, . . . , am}) = 0. (3)
Suppose by way of contradiction that for some m ∈ N there exists a Z > 0 and a subsequence
(kr)
∞
r=1 such that σ
kr ({a1, . . . , am}) ≥ Z for every r ∈ N. Notice that, for every r ∈ N, action bm+1
gives in expectation at least Z
m+1 to player 3 against σ
kr , hence at least (1− βkr2 (t2, {a∞})) ·
Z
m+1
against βkr . Now consider any action bw with w >
m+1
Z
. Since player 3’s highest payoff for
action bw is
1
w
, action bw gives player 3 in expectation strictly less than
Z
m+1 against σ
kr , hence
strictly less than (1− βkr2 (t2, {a∞})) ·
Z
m+1 against β
kr . Therefore, player 3’s best responses are in
{b1, . . . , b⌊m+1
Z
⌋} against β
kr for any r ∈ N. Since player 3’s best responses along this subsequence
are not approaching b∞ with respect to the weak metric, the sequence β
k cannot satisfy both
conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 15. Thus, (3) holds as claimed.
Let k1 = 1 and m1 ∈ N be such that σ
k1({a1, . . . , am1}) >
1
2 . Then, by (3), there exists a k2 > k1
and an m2 > m1 such that σ
k2({am1+1, . . . , am2}) >
1
2 . By repeating this argument, we obtain in
N two strictly increasing sequences (mr)
∞
r=1 and (kr)
∞
r=1 such that for every r ∈ N
σkr({am |m ∈Wr}) >
1
2
, (4)
where Wr = {mr−1+1, . . . ,mr} and m0 = 0. Note that the sets Wr, r ∈ N, form a partition of N.
Now let t1 be the type in {0, 1}
N such that fm(t1) = 1 if m ∈Wr for an odd r ∈ N and fm(t1) = 0
if m ∈ Wr for an even r ∈ N. Take an arbitrary odd r ∈ N. Then, fm(t1) = 1 for any m ∈ Wr,
and since σkr({am |m ∈ Wr}) >
1
2 due to (4), player 1’s unique best response to β
kr is action U .
Similarly, when r ∈ N is even, player 1’s unique best response to βkr is action D. So, the sequence
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βk cannot satisfy both conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 15 for type t1, which is a contradiction.
Consequently, there is no pointwise-perfect strategy profile in this game.
7 Appendix II: Proofs for the auction in Section 5
Throughout the Appendix.2, we will use the notion Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) for bidder 2’s expected profit
given his type t2 and bid b2 against a strategy τ1 of bidder 1. If bidder 1 makes a bid b1 > b2, then
bidder 2 does not win the object and has zero profit. Therefore, if bidding b2 against τ1 leads to a
tie with zero ex-ante probability, then we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) τ1(t1, db1) dt1. (5)
Since the function 5 + t2 − αt1 − b1 is bounded on [0, 1] × [5 − α, 6] and measurable with respect
to T × A, then according to the Theorem 10.2.1 in Dudley [9], Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) is well-defined.
In the special case when τ1 is a deterministic strategy, i.e. when τ1(t1, ·) = δp1(t1)(·) for a pure
strategy p1, we have∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) τ1(t1, db1) =
{
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) if p1(t1) ∈ [5− α, b2]
0 if p1(t1) ∈ (b2, 6].
Hence, if p1 is increasing and b2 ∈ p1(T1), then we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1. (6)
7.1 Proof of Proposition 24
We prove that the deterministic strategy profile β = (β1, β2) in which βi corresponds to the pure
strategy Bi(ti) = 5 + (1 − α)ti for each bidder i, is a BNE. For this purpose, we prove that β2 is
a best response against β1. Then, due to symmetry, β1 is also a best response against β2, and the
proof will be complete.
According to (6), if b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] then we have
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ B−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 −B1(t1)) dt1
=
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
=
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(t2 − t1) dt1
= t2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
−
1
2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)2
.
By taking the first derivative with respect to b2
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
t2
1− α
−
1
1− α
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
.
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It is clear that
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, 5) ≥ 0 and
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, 6− α) ≤ 0,
which implies that the maximum of Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6−α] is attained where
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 |
t2, b2) = 0. This happens exactly when
b2 = 5 + (1− α)t2 = B2(t2).
Notice that, for bidder 2, bidding less than 5 is never better than bidding 5 exactly, because all
bids less than or equal to 5 win against β1 with probability 0. Similarly, bidding more than 6−α is
never better than bidding 6−α exactly, because all bids larger than or equal to 6−α win against
β1 with probability 1. Therefore, β2 is a best response to β1 as claimed.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 25
Consider two pure strategies p1 and p2 that satisfy conditions (i), (ii) of Proposition 25, and the
corresponding deterministic strategies τ1 and τ2. Suppose that (τ1, τ2) is a BNE. Our goal is to
show that p1(t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1 and p2(t2) = 5 + (1− α)t2.
Recall that T1 = T2 = [0, 1], and A1 = A2 = [5 − α, 6]. Notice that p1 : T1 → A1 and p2 : T2 →
A2 are continuous and invertible, and therefore they have a continuous inverse. Thus, because
p1(T1) = p2(T2), the function pˆ = p
−1
1 ◦ p2 is well defined and it is a continuous strictly increasing
bijection from T2 to T1.
First we argue that p2(0) ≤ 5. Suppose by way of contradiction that p2(0) > 5. According to (6)
we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) =
∫ pˆ(t2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1.
Notice that if t2 > 0 then pˆ(t2) > 0 due to conditions (i) and (ii), and moreover, for every type
t2 < p2(0)− 5 we have
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) ≤ 5 + t2 − p1(t1) ≤ 5 + t2 − p1(0) = 5 + t2 − p2(0) < 0.
Therefore, Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) is strictly negative. However, as p1(0) = p2(0) > 5, bidder 2 can get
zero by bidding 5 for instance, which never wins. This is a contradiction with the assumption that
τ2 is a best response to τ1, so p2(0) ≤ 5 holds indeed.
Now we prove that p2(1) ≥ 6 − α. Write c := 6 − α − p2(1) and suppose by way of contradiction
that c > 0. According to (6), if we compare bids p2(1) and p2(t2) for bidder 2 when his type is t2,
we obtain
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(1))− Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) =
∫ 1
pˆ(t2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1.
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Notice that if t2 ∈ (1− c, 1), then pˆ(t2) < 1 due to conditions (i) and (ii), and moreover, for every
t1 ∈ [0, 1] we have
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) ≥ 5 + t2 − α− p1(1)
= 5 + t2 − α− p2(1)
= 5 + t2 − α+ c− 6 + α
= −1 + t2 + c
> 0.
Therefore, for every t2 ∈ (1− c, 1)
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(1))− Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) > 0,
which is in contradiction with the assumption that τ2 is a best response to τ1. Hence, p2(1) ≥ 6−α
holds indeed.
Now, we calculate bidder 2’s best response bids against τ1, given his type t2. It is clear that, for
any type t2, bidding p2(0) is not worse than any bid in [5 − α, p2(0)], because all these bids win
with probability zero against τ1. Similarly, bidding p2(1) is not worse than any bid in [p2(1), 6],
because all these bids win with probability 1 against τ1. It remains to determine the best bids in
the interval [p2(0), p2(1)]. By (6), we have for every bid b2 ∈ [p2(0), p2(1)] that
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1
=
[
(5 + t2)t1 −
α
2
t21
]p−11 (b2)
0
−
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
p1(t1) dt1
= (5 + t2)p
−1
1 (b2)−
α
2
(
p−11 (b2)
)2
−
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
p1(t1) dt1.
Bidder 2 wants to maximize this expression over b2 ∈ [p2(0), p2(1)] = [p1(0), p1(1)]. So, using the
substitution y = p−11 (b2) the optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing over y ∈ [0, 1] the
function
F (y) = (5 + t2) · y −
α
2
· y2 −
∫ y
0
p1(t1) dt1.
Since p1 is continuous, F is continuously differentiable. So, the first order condition yields
5 + t2 − α · y − p1(y) = 0.
Note that by assumption the type t2 for which p2(t2) = b2 solves this condition, and that y =
p−11 (b2) by definition. The first order condition can be rewritten to
p1(y) = 5 + t2 − α · y.
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Substituting y = p−11 (b2) yields
b2 = 5 + t2 − α · p
−1
1 (b2).
Next, substituting p2(t2) = b2 yields
p2(t2) = 5 + t2 − α · p
−1
1 (p2(t2)).
In the same way we find
p1(t1) = 5 + t1 − α · p
−1
2 (p1(t1)).
Now take any z ∈ [0, 1]. We argue that p1(z) = p2(z). If α = 0, this is immediately clear. Suppose
α > 0. Assume without loss that p1(z) > p2(z). We derive a contradiction.
Since p1(z) > p2(z), we have z > p
−1
1 (p2(z)) and also p
−1
2 (p1(z)) > z. So, p
−1
2 (p1(z)) > z >
p−11 (p2(z)). Taking t1 = z = t2, we find
p1(z)− p2(z) = α ·
[
p−11 (p2(z))− p
−1
2 (p1(z))
]
< 0.
This contradicts the assumption that p1(z) > p2(z).
Thus, p1(z) = p2(z) for all z ∈ [0, 1], so that p
−1
2 (p1(t1)) = t1 and p
−1
1 (p2(t2) = t2. It follows that
p1(t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1 and p2(t2) = 5 + (1− α)t2. This completes the proof of Proposition 25.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 29
Suppose that (b1, b2) is symmetric and deterministic, b1 = b2 is strictly increasing, and b1 is sincere
given b2. Since b1 = b2 by symmetry, and since b1 = b2 is strictly increasing, we have that
E(t2 | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = E(t2 | t1 > t2) =
1
2
t1.
So, since b1 is sincere given b2, using the above equality we have that
b1(t1) = E(v1(t1, t2) | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = E(5 + t1 − αt2 | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = 5 + t1 −
α
2
t1.
So, b1(t1) = 5 + t1 −
α
2 t1 and b2(t2) = 5 + t2 −
α
2 t2. This implies that (b1, b2) ∈ F. So, since
b1(t1) > B1(t1) for every type t1 > 0, Proposition 25 shows that (b1, b2) does not constitute a
BNE.
It is worthwhile to mention that even if we look at the situation in which bidder 1 naively bids his
ex ante expected valuation, the same conclusion holds. In that case bidder 1’s expected evaluation
of the object given his type t1 is
E(v1(t1, t2) | t1) = E(5 + t1 − αt2 | t1) = 5 + t1 −
α
2
,
and the same reasoning as before shows that also this does not yield a BNE.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 30
We prove that neither bidder has a dominant strategy. To this end we prove that every strategy
σi of player i = 1, 2 is not dominant. Suppose σ2 is a dominant strategy for bidder 2. Notice
that if bidder 1 chooses strategy β1 and if bidder 2 is given type t2 ∈ (0, 1), then bidding β2 is
bidder 2’s unique best response (see the proof of Proposition 24). This implies that σ2 = β2. Now
we show that the strategies β2 is not in dominant strategies. To this end we show that β2 is not
a best response against all strategies of bidder 1. Suppose that bidder 1’s strategy is given by
λ1(t1, ·) = δb1(t1)(·) for every t1 ∈ T1, where
b1(t1) =
{ 11
2 if t1 ∈ [0,
1
2 ]
6 if t1 ∈ (
1
2 , 1].
We prove that if t2 =
1+α
2 , then β2 is not a best response for bidder 2 against λ1. Notice
that bidder 2 gets zero by bidding B2(
1+α
2 ), because it never wins against λ1 due to B2(
1+α
2 ) =
5 + (1 − α)( 1+α2 ) <
11
2 . However, by (6), bidder 2’s expected profit given type t2 =
1+α
2 and
b2 ∈ (
11
2 , 6) is
Eλ1(Π2 |
1 + α
2
, b2) =
∫ 1
2
0
(
5 +
1 + α
2
− αt1 −
11
2
)
dt1 =
α
8
> 0.
This shows that if t2 =
1+α
2 then bidding b2 ∈ (
11
2 , 6) is strictly better than bidding B2(
1+α
2 ).
Hence, β2 is not in dominant strategies. This proves that bidder 2 does not have a dominant
strategy at all, and by symmetry the same is true for bidder 1. The proof is complete.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 26
We prove that the BNE β = (β1, β2) is uniform-perfect. For this purpose, define the curves
CM , CT , CL : [0, 1]→ [5− α, 6] by
CM (t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1,
CT (t1) = 6− αt
2
1,
CL(t1) = 5− α+ α(1− t1)
2.
Let µ be the uniform distribution on A1 = [5 − α, 6]. For every k ∈ N, let εk =
1
k+3 and
βk1 : T1 × A1 → [0, 1] be the completely mixed strategy for bidder 1 which is given for every
t1 ∈ T1 = [0, 1] by
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k) δCM (t1)(·) + εk δCT (t1)(·) + εk δCL(t1)(·) + ε
2
k µ(·).
Similarly, define a completely mixed strategy βk2 for bidder 2. We show that the sequence of
strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , β
k
2 )
∞
k=1 satisfies conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 21.
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 36
It is clear from the definition of βi(ti, ·) and β
k
i (ti, ·), for each bidder i, that
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 2εk + ε
2
k.
Hence, condition 1 of Definition 21 is satisfied. Condition 2 of Definition 21 follows from the claim
below.
Claim: For every ξ ∈ (0, α), there is a Kξ ∈ N such that for every k > Kξ we have:
1. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 6] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5− ξ, 5 + 2ξ(1− α)].
2. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [CM (t2)− ξ(1− α), CM (t2) + ξ(1− α)].
3. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2ξ(1− α), 6− α+ ξ].
The above claim is illustrated in Figure 1. According to the claim, the gray area includes all best
response bids for bidder 2 if k > Kξ.
b2
t2
5
5 − α
5 − ξ
5 + 2ξ(1 − α)
6 − α
6
6 − α + ξ
6 − α − 2ξ(1 − α)
0 1ξ 1 − ξ
CM
Figure 1: bidder 2’s best response bids
Take an arbitrary ξ ∈ (0,min{α, 12}). To prove this claim, it is enough to show that the following
claims 1, 2 and 3 are valid. These claims corresponds to three cases, i.e., 6 − α ≤ b2 ≤ 6,
5− α ≤ b2 ≤ 5 and 5 ≤ b2 ≤ 6− α.
Claim 1: for the case 6− α ≤ b2 ≤ 6
There is an M1ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M
1
ξ we have:
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1. For every t2 ∈ [0, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6 − α, 6] is attained at
b2 = 6− α.
2. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α, 6− α+ ξ].
Claim 2: for the case 5− α ≤ b2 ≤ 5
There is an M2ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M
2
ξ we have:
1. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 5] is attained at b2 = 5.
2. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 5] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5− ξ, 5].
Claim 3: for case 5 ≤ b2 ≤ 6− α
There is an M3ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M
3
ξ we have:
1. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6 − α] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [CM (t2)− ξ(1− α), CM (t2) + ξ(1− α)].
2. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6−α] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5, 5 + 2ξ(1− α)].
3. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6 − α] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2ξ(1− α), 6− α].
It is important to note that Part (1) of Claim 1 shows that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1− ξ], the maximum
of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6− α, 6] is not more than the maximum over b2 ∈ [5, 6− α], which is
verified in Claim 3. Similarly, Part (1) of Claim 2 indicates that for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1], the maximum
of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5− α, 5] is not more than the maximum over b2 ∈ [5, 6− α].
Proof of Claim 1: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [6−α, 6]. Note that C
−1
T (b2) ∈ [0, 1]
is the unique type t1 for bidder 1 such that CT (t1) = b2. By the definition of CT , we have
C−1T (b2) =
√
6−b2
α
. Therefore, by (5)
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1
=
∫ C−1
T
(b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1 I
+
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1. II
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 38
From the definition of βk1 (t1, ·) we obtain
I = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ C−1
T
(b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ C−1
T
(b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ C−1
T
(b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Similarly, we have
II = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CT (t1)) dt1.
Hence, by the definition of the curves CM , CT , and CL we obtain
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = I + II = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ 1
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)
2
)
dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 6 + αt
2
1
)
dt1.
Thus,
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)(t2 −
1
2
) + εk(t2 +
α
6
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
T
(b2)
(
−1 + t2 − αt1 + αt
2
1
)
dt1.
Note that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 6− α)− Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6) = −
ε2k
1 + α
∫ 6
6−α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b1) db1
− εk
∫ 1
0
(
−1 + t2 − αt1 + αt
2
1
)
dt1
=
(
α
1 + α
)
ε2k(1− t2) + εk(1− t2 +
α
6
) > 0,
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and also that Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) is continuous on the compact set (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α, 6]. Therefore,
there is a y > 0 (without loss of generality we can assume that y ∈ (0, α− ξ), in order to make the
analysis easier) such that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1] and b2 ∈ (6− y, 6]
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 6− α) > Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2).
This means that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], bidding 6 − α is strictly better than any bid in the interval
(6− y, 6]. Hence, it suffices to prove Claim 1 over b2 ∈ [6− α, 6− y]. We do so by examining the
first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2, which equals to
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = ε
2
k · q1(t2, b2) + εk · q2(t2, b2),
where
q1(t2, b2) =
1
1 + α
· (5 + t2 −
α
2
− b2)
q2(t2, b2) =
1
2α · C−1T (b2)
·
(
−1 + t2 − αC
−1
T (b2) + α(C
−1
T (b2))
2
)
.
Note that q2(t2, b2) is strictly negative for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1] × [6 − α, 6 − y] \ {(1, 6 − α)}, and
q2(1, 6− α) = 0.
Because q2 is strictly negative on the compact set [0, 1− ξ]× [6−α, 6−y], it has a strictly negative
upper-bound on [0, 1 − ξ] × [6 − α, 6 − y]. Therefore, since ε2k is relatively much smaller than εk
for sufficiently large k, then d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) < 0 for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1− ξ]× [6−α, 6− y]. This
proves that there exists an N1ξ ∈ N such that for every k > N
1
ξ we have
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) < 0
for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1− ξ]× [6− α, 6− y]. Hence, part (1) of Claim 1 holds for all k > N
1
ξ .
Because q2 is strictly negative on the compact set [1−ξ, 1]× [6−α+ξ, 6−y], we can apply a similar
argument and find an L1ξ ∈ N such that part (2) of Claim 1 holds for every k > L
1
ξ . Therefore, by
choosing M1ξ = max{N
1
ξ , L
1
ξ}, Claim 1 is valid for every k > M
1
ξ .
Proof of Claim 2: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [5 − α, 5]. Note that type
C−1L (b2) ∈ [0, 1] is the unique type t1 for bidder 1 such that CL(t1) = b2. By the definition of CL,
we have C−1L (b2) = 1−
√
b2−5
α
+ 1. Hence, by (5)
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1
=
∫ C−1
L
(b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1 III
+
∫ 1
C
−1
L
(b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) β
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1. IV
Therefore, we have
III = ε2k
∫ C−1
L
(b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1,
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IV = εk
∫ 1
C
−1
L
(b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
C
−1
L
(b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Hence, by the definition of the curve CL we obtain
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = III + IV = ε
2
k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
L
(b2)
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)
2
)
dt1
=
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
C
−1
L
(b2)
(t2 + αt1 − αt
2
1) dt1.
Note that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 5)− Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5− α) =
ε2k
1 + α
∫ 5
5−α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(t2 + αt1 − αt
2
1) dt1
=
(
α
1 + α
)
ε2kt2 + εk(t2 +
α
6
) > 0,
and also that Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) is continuous on the compact set (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α, 5]. Therefore,
there is a y > 0 (similar to the previous case assume that y ∈ (0, α−ξ)) such that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
and b2 ∈ [5− α, 5− α+ y)
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 5) > Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2).
This means that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], bidding 5 is strictly better than any bid in the interval
[5− α, 5− α+ y). Hence, it suffices to prove Claim 2 over the interval [5− α+ y, 5]. We do so by
examining the first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2, which equals to
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = ε
2
kp1(t2, b2) + εkp2(t2, b2),
where
p1(t2, b2) =
1
1 + α
· (5 + t2 −
α
2
− b2),
p2(t2, b2) =
1
2α · (1− C−1L (b2))
· (t2 + αC
−1
L (b2)0− αC
−1
L (b2)
2).
Note that p2(t2, b2) is strictly positive for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α+y, 5]\{(0, 5)}, and p2(0, 5) = 0.
With an argument similar to that of the previous case, we can find an M2ξ such that for every
k > M2ξ Claim 2 is valid.
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Proof of Claim 3: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [5, 6−α]. Note that C
−1
M (b2) =
b2−5
1−α
for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α]. With a similar argument as before we have
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Hence, by the definition of the curves CM and CL we obtain
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)
2
)
dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Thus,
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(t2 − t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
t2 + αt1 − αt
2
1
)
dt1
+
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b1) db1
= (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
(
t2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
−
1
2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)2)
+ εk(t2 +
α
6
)
+
ε2k
2(1 + α)
(b2 − 5 + α)(5 + 2t2 − b2).
So, the first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2 is
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2)
=
1− 2εk − ε
2
k
1− α
·
(
t2 −
b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(5 + t2 −
α
2
− b2). (7)
First, we prove that for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) cannot be attained
on the boundary of interval [5, 6− α]. Observe that
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 5) =
1− 2εk − ε
2
k
1− α
· t2 +
ε2k
1 + α
(t2 −
α
2
),
and
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 6− α) =
1− 2εk − ε
2
k
1− α
· (t2 − 1) +
ε2k
1 + α
(t2 − 1 +
α
2
).
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Hence, there is an N3ξ ∈ N such that if k > N
3
ξ then for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1− ξ] we have
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 5) > 0
and
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, 6− α) < 0.
Therefore, by the continuity of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2), we can conclude for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1− ξ] that if b2
maximizes Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2), then
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | t2, b2) = 0. (8)
One can check with the help of (7) that the unique solution of (8), for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], is
b2(t2) =
(1− 2εk − ε
2
k)(1 + α)
v(εk)
· (5 + (1− α)t2) +
ε2k(1− α)
2
v(εk)
(5 + t2 −
α
2
),
where
v(εk) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)(1 + α) + ε
2
k(1− α)
2.
One can verify that
|b2(t2)− CM (t2)| =
αε2k(1− α)
2
v(εk)
∣∣∣∣t2 − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ αε2k(1− α)22v(εk) .
Therefore, there is an L3ξ ∈ N such that for every k > L
3
ξ and every t2 ∈ [0, 1] we have
|b2(t2)− CM (t2)| ≤ ξ(1− α).
By choosing M3ξ = max{N
3
ξ , L
3
ξ}, for every k > M
3
ξ , part (1) of Claim 3 is valid.
Since at t2 = 0, for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] we have
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | 0, b2) =
1− 2εk − ε
2
k
1− α
·
(
−
b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(5−
α
2
− b2) < 0,
the maximum at t2 = 0 is obtained at b2 = 5. Moreover, by part (1) of Claim 3 we have that if
k > max{N3ξ , L
3
ξ}, then for t2 = ξ the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [5, 5 + 2(1 − α)ξ]. One
can verify that in (7), the first derivative of unique solution b2(t2) is strictly positive, then we can
conclude that for every t2 ∈ [0, ξ) the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [5, 5+2(1−α)ξ], for large
k.
With a similar argument, since at t2 = 1 for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] we have
d
db2
Eβk1
(Π2 | 1, b2) =
1− 2εk − ε
2
k
1− α
·
(
1−
b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(6−
α
2
− b2) > 0,
the maximum at t2 = 1 is obtained in b2 = 6 − α. Moreover, if k > max{N
3
ξ , L
3
ξ}, then for
t2 = 1− ξ the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2(1− α)ξ, 6− α]. Similarly, since b2
′(t2)
is strictly positive, we conclude that for every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum is obtained within
b2 ∈ [6− α− 2(1− α)ξ, 6− α] for large k. This complete the proof of Claim 3, for every k > M
3
ξ .
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7.6 Proofs of Propositions 27 and 28
It is easy to check that strategy profiles σ and η are BNEs.
We now prove that the BNE σ = (σ1, σ2), in which σ1(t1, ·) = δ6(·) and σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·), is not
pointwise-perfect, consequently is not uniform-perfect. Let (σk1 )
∞
k=1 be a sequence of completely
mixed strategies for bidder 1 such that ρw(σk1 , σ1) −→ 0 as k →∞. We show that bidder’s 2 best
response against σk1 does not converge to σ2 when k →∞.
Suppose that bidder 1 plays σk1 , for some k ∈ N. We prove that for t2 = 1, the best response of
bidder 2 is far from σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·). Note that bidder 2 gets always zero by choosing σ2, because
he never wins. So, it is enough to show that his expected profit is strictly positive by bidding 6−α,
when t2 = 1. We compute bidder 2’s expected profit given type t2 = 1 and bid b2 = 6− α.
Eσk1
(Π2 | 1, 6− α) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(5 + 1− αt1 − b1) σ
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1.
Since σk1 is a completely mixed strategy we have σ
k
1 (t1, (5− α, 6− α)) > 0, therefore by using the
fact that b1 ∈ (5− α, 6− α) we have
Eσk1
(Π2 | 1, 6− α) >
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(5 + 1− αt1 − 6 + α) σ
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1
= α
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(1− t1) σ
k
1 (t1, db1) dt1 ≥ 0.
This implies that Eσk1 (Π2 | 1, 6− α) > 0, hence σ2 is not pointwise-perfect.
With a similar argument, one can prove that the discontinuous BNE η is not pointwise-perfect,
and hence not uniform-perfect either.
8 Appendix III: A measurability result for the weak dis-
tance
A strategy βi for some player i is said to be countably supported if there exists a countable set
B ⊆ Ai such that βi(ti, B) = 1 for every ti ∈ Ti.
Lemma 31 Assume that the action space Ai is separable for a player i ∈ N . Then, for every
strategy βi for player i, there exists a sequence (τ
k
i )
∞
k=1 of countably supported strategies such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(τki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0 (9)
for every type ti ∈ Ti.
Proof.
Part 1: The definition of the sequence (τki )
∞
k=1: Since Ai is separable, it has a countable
dense subset A∗i = {aj}j∈N.
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Take a k ∈ N. For every a ∈ Ai, let U
k(a) = {a′ ∈ Ai | dAi(a, a
′) < 1
k
}. Let Bk1 = U
k(a1), and
then define recursively Bkj = U
k(aj) \ ∪
j−1
ℓ=1Bℓ for every j ∈ N with j ≥ 2. Let
Jk = {j ∈ N | Bkj 6= ∅}.
Since A∗i is dense in Ai, it follows that {B
k
j | j ∈ J
k} is a partition of Ai. Moreover, by construction,
Bkj ∈ Ai for every j ∈ J
k. Take an arbitrary bkj ∈ B
k
j for every j ∈ J
k.
Now define the countably supported strategy τki for player i by
τki (ti, ·) =
∑
j∈Jk
βi(ti, B
k
j ) · δbkj (·)
for every ti ∈ Ti, where as usual, δ stands for the Dirac measure. Note that τ
k
i satisfies condition
(2) of the definition of behavior strategies, because for every Z ∈ Ai
τki (·, Z) =
∑
j∈Jk : bk
j
∈Z
βi(·, B
k
j ).
Part 2: The proof that the sequence (τki )
∞
k=1 satisfies equality (9): Fix a type ti ∈
Ti. Consider a bounded Lipschitz function f : Ai → R. Then, there exists C ≥ 0 such that
|f(a) − f(a′)| ≤ C · dAi(a, a
′) for every a, a′ ∈ Ai. In particular, for every j ∈ J
k, since the
diameter of Bkj is at most
2
k
, we have |f(a)− f(a′)| ≤ C · 2
k
for every a, a′ ∈ Bkj . Thus,∣∣∣∣∫
Ai
f(a) τki (ti, da)−
∫
Ai
f(a) βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
j∈Jk
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bk
j
f(a) τki (ti, da)−
∫
Bk
j
f(a) βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
j∈Jk
∣∣∣∣∣f(bkj ) · βi(ti, Bkj )−
∫
Bk
j
f(a) βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
j∈Jk
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bk
j
[
f(bkj )− f(a)
]
βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
j∈Jk
sup
a∈Bk
j
∣∣f(bkj )− f(a)∣∣ · βi(ti, Bkj )
≤
∑
j∈Jk
C ·
2
k
· βi(ti, B
k
j )
= C ·
2
k
.
Hence,
∫
Ai
f(a) τki (ti, da) converges to
∫
Ai
f(a) βi(ti, da) as k tends to infinity. Because f was an
arbitrary bounded Lipschitz function from Ai to R, the proof of (9) is complete. 
Lemma 32 Assume that the action space Ai is separable for a player i ∈ N , and let β
1
i and β
2
i be
two strategies for player i. Then, the function f : Ti → R defined by f(ti) = ρ
w(β1i (ti, ·), β
2
i (ti, ·))
is measurable.
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Proof. It suffices to prove that the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is measurable for every r ∈ R. So, fix
an arbitrary r ∈ R.
Part 1: when β1i and β
2
i are countably supported strategies.
First assume that β1i and β
2
i are countably supported strategies. Then, there are countable sets
B1, B2 ⊆ Ai such that β
1
i (ti, B
1) = 1 and β2i (ti, B
2) = 1 for every ti ∈ Ti. Let B = B
1 ∪ B2. We
have
f(ti) = inf
{
ε > 0 | β1i (ti, C) ≤ β
2
i (ti, C
ε) + ε and β2i (ti, C) ≤ β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε ∀C ∈ Ai
}
.
Notice that if β1i (ti, C) ≤ β
2
i (ti, C
ε)+ε for some C ⊆ B, then for any C˜ ∈ Ai satisfying C˜∩B = C,
we obtain
β1i (ti, C˜) = β
1
i (ti, C) ≤ β
2
i (ti, C
ε) + ε ≤ β2i (ti, C˜
ε) + ε.
Similarly, if β2i (ti, C) ≤ β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε then
β2i (ti, C˜) ≤ β
1
i (ti, C˜
ε) + ε.
Hence,
f(ti) = inf
{
ε > 0 | β1i (ti, C) ≤ β
2
i (ti, C
ε) + ε and β2i (ti, C) ≤ β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε ∀C ⊆ B
}
.
Notice that f(ti) > r holds if and only if there exist an m ∈ N and a set C ⊆ B such that for
ε = r + 1
m
we have either β1i (ti, C) > β
2
i (ti, C
ε) + ε or β2i (ti, C) > β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε. Indeed, the
“only if”-part is immediate, whereas the “if”-part follows from the fact that β2i (ti, C
ε) + ε and
β1i (ti, C
ε) + ε are increasing in ε.
As B is countable, we can even restrict to finite subsets of B: thus f(ti) > r holds if and only if
there exist an m ∈ N and a finite set C ⊆ B such that for ε = r + 1
m
we have either β1i (ti, C) >
β2i (ti, C
ε) + ε or β2i (ti, C) > β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε.
For every m ∈ N and finite C ⊆ B, define
U1m,C =
{
ti ∈ Ti |β
1
i (ti, C) > β
2
i (ti, C
r+ 1
m ) + r +
1
m
}
U2m,C =
{
ti ∈ Ti |β
2
i (ti, C) > β
1
i (ti, C
r+ 1
m ) + r +
1
m
}
.
Since by condition (2) of the definition of behavior strategies, the section functions β1i (·, C) : Ti → R
and β2i (·, C
r+ 1
m ) : Ti → R are measurable, the sets U
1
m,C are measurable. For a similar reason, the
sets U2m,C are measurable too. Now we have
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} =
∞⋃
m=1
⋃
finite C⊆B
[
U1m,C
⋃
U2m,C
]
.
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Because the right hand side is a countable union of measurable sets, the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is
measurable as well. So, the claim of the lemma holds for countably supported strategies.
Part 2: when β1i and β
2
i are arbitrary strategies.
Now we prove the lemma for arbitrary strategies β1i and β
2
i . By Lemma 31, there are two sequences
of countably supported strategies (τk,1i )
∞
k=1 and (τ
k,2
i )
∞
k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), β
1
i (ti, ·)) = 0, and lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,2i (ti, ·), β
2
i (ti, ·)) = 0
for every type ti ∈ Ti. By the definition of f , we have
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} = {ti ∈ Ti | lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τ
k,2
i (ti, ·)) > r}.
Notice that, for some ti ∈ Ti, the inequality
lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τ
k,2
i (ti, ·)) > r
holds if and only if there exists an m ∈ N such that ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τ
k,2
i (ti, ·)) > r +
1
m
holds for
sufficiently large k. Therefore,
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} =
∞⋃
m=1
∞⋃
ℓ=1
∞⋂
k=ℓ
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρ
w(τk,1i (ti, ·), τ
k,2
i (ti, ·)) > r +
1
m
}
.
For each k ∈ N, because the strategies τk,1i and τ
k,2
i are countably supported, part 1 of the proof
implies that set {
ti ∈ Ti | ρ
w(τk,1i (ti, ·), τ
k,2
i (ti, ·)) > r +
1
m
}
is measurable. Therefore, the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is measurable as well. 
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